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1. INTRODUCTION 
This essay addresses an evolving legal concept, "ceremonial deism." The Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment bars government from "pass[ing] laws which aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."1 The legal concept 66Ceremonia1 deism," 
however, would shield the Pledge of Allegiance, legislative prayers, and other government 
references to religion from strict analysis under the Lemon test, endorsement test, and coercion 
test-i.e., from routine adjudication under the Establishment Clause. To illustrate, consider a 
challenge to the constitutionality of the Pledge. "The addition ofthe words 'under God' to the 
Pledge does, and was [legislatively] intended to, have the effect of endorsing religion. "2 
Granting this, the Pledge would seem destined to fail the Lemon and endorsement tests, in view 
of its impermissible religious purpose and effect.3 On the strength of"ceremonial deism," 
however, a court may declare that ''under God" is merely ceremonial, and that it does not offend 
the Establishment Clause. In support of this claim, the court will perform a sort of judicial 
taxidermy, whereby religious words are killed if only to keep them on hand, safely, in civic halls. 
Ceremonial deism invites such results by underplaying the sacred import of governmental 
references to religion, and by stressii:J.g their value as rneans tu secular t:;uus. These secular ends 
include recognition of the role that religion has played in our nation's development;4 creation of 
1 Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
2 Stephen B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 2083, 2091 
(1996). 
3 The endorsement test is often regarded as a refinement of the Lemon test, which examines a challenged 
statute by means of a three-prong analysis: 1) does the statute have a secular purpose; 2) is it the primary 
effect of that statute to advance or inhibit religion; 3) does the statute excessively entangle government with 
religion. (See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971)). The endorsement test couples prongs 
one and two of the Lemon test and concentrates on whether a statute intended an endorsement and whether 
an endorsement is nonetheless perceived. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
4 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
("[A]lthough these references speak in the language of religious belief, they are more properly understood 
as employing the idiom for essentially secular purposes. One such purpose is to commemorate the role of 
2 
a ceremonial atmosphere during civic events;5 and inspiration for overcoming a national crisis. 6 
Ceremonial deism, in other words, stands for the proposition that it is appropriate to retain 
government-sponsored religious speech for either of two reasons: to impart historic reflections 
about our nation's past (the "description" argument), or to establish an appropriate air of dignity 
during public assemblies (the "solemnization" argument). 
Reliance on the argument for ceremonial deism creates special problems for a pluralistic 
society. With each passing year, government acknowledgments of religion stand to marginalize 
more individuals, whether adherents to minority religions or out-and-out unbelievers. Tests 
under the Establishment Clause, therefore, should give sufficient attention to the effects of 
official references to religion. Under the logic of ceremonial deism, however, a court need not 
wrestle with the marginalizing effect of an official acknowledgment; rather, the court may deny 
the threat of marginalization altogether by declaring the words at issue wholly void of religious 
force. 
In 2005, Justice O'Connor delivered the high court's first sustained analysis of 
ceremonial deism. Her analysis culminated in a modification of the endorsement test-in the 
form of a four-prong test to determine valid instances of ceremonial deism. This essay addresses 
her test. Section II of this essay provides an overview of the origin and use of the term 
ceremonial deism. Section III introduces Justice O'Connor's test for ceremonial deism and the 
context in which she presented it. Section IV begins my critique of the test, pinpointing 
assumptions made by Justice O'Connor prefatory to her submission of the test's prongs, 
followed by an evaluation of the prongs themselves. Finally, Section V concludes this essay by 
religion in our history."). 
5 Lynch v. Donnelly, 466 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]hese references are uniquely 
suited to serve such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring commitment to 
meet some national challenge .... "). 
6 !d. 
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arguing that Justice O'Connor's test fails to legitimate ceremonial deism. 
II. THE ORIGIN AND USE OF THE TERM AND CONCEPT "CEREl\IIONIAL DEISM" 
A. Academic Coinage of the Term and High Court Application Thereof 
The term "ceremonial deism" originated in a 1962 lecture by Eugene Rostow, dean of 
Yale Law School. 7 The coinage might well have died in its academic crib--the lecture remains 
unpublished-if not for Harvard Professor Arthur Sutherland's reference to the term in a 1964 
book review. 8 According to Sutherland, Rostow coined the term in order to describe a "class of 
public activity, which ... could be accepted as so conventional and uncontroversial as to be 
constitutional"9-i.e., to describe governmental expressions of religion that need not be adjudged 
violations of the Establishment Clause. 
The term ceremonial deism was explicitly used in three Supreme Court cases-in dissent 
in Lynch v. Donnelly (1984), 10 in the majority opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU (1989), ll 
and in concurrence in County of Allegheny. 12 
Justice Brennan used the term in Lynch, which upheld a city-maintained Christmas 
display among whose Yule tree and Santa-related decorations appeared a creche. 13 In his 
dissent, Justice Brennan explored principles under which the Court weighs government 
acknowledgments of religion. 14 He confessed to uncertainty about this area of jurisprudence but 
nonetheless extracted a baseline: "I would suggest that such practices as the designation of' In 
7 Davison M. Douglas, Ceremonial Deism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 259 (Paul 
Finkelman ed., 2006). 
8 Calvin Massey, The Political Marketplace of Religion, 57 Hastings L.J. 1, 54 n. 211 (2005). 
9 Epstein, supra note 2, at 2174 n. 29. 
10 Lynch, 466 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
11 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 n. 46, and 603. 
12 Id at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
13 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670. 
14 !d. at 715-716. 
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God We Trust' as our national motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge of 
Allegiance to the flag can best be understood, in Dean Rostow' s apt phrase, as a form of 
'ceremonial deism,' protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost 
through rote repetition any significant religious content."15 These practices and references, he 
wrote, "are uniquely suited to serve such wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public 
occasions, or inspiring commitment to meet some national challenge in a manner that simply 
could not be fully served in our culture if government were limited to purely nonreligious 
phrases." 16 
Justice Blackmun referred to ceremonial deism in County of Allegheny, which announced 
two decisions-one upholding a public holiday display that featured a Christmas tree, menorah, 
and sign promoting "liberty," 17 located outside the City-County Building; the other decision 
holding against a creche located on the staircase of the County Courthouse. 18 In the majority 
opinion, Justice Blackmun quoted with approval Justice O'Connor's Lynch concurrence, wherein 
she referred to legislative prayer as an official acknowledgment of religion that "serve[s], in the 
only wa[y] reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing 
public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is 
worthy of appreciation in society."19 Justice O'Connor did not use the term ceremonial deism in 
Lynch, but Justice Blackmun viewed her analysis as illustrative of this doctrine. "The function 
and history of this form of ceremonial deism," he continued, "suggest that 'those practices [the 
Pledge and motto] are not understood as conveying government approval of particular religious 
15 Jd. at 716. 
16 Id. at 717. 
17 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 582 (the sign read: ~~During this holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes 
liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of 
freedom"). 
18 Id at 578. 
19 !d. at 595, n. 46 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. 669, 693) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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beliefs. "'20 Later in his opinion, Justice Blackmun used the term ceremonial deism in a manner 
indicative of the weight he accorded this concept; referring to Justice O'Connor's Lynch 
concurrence and Justice Brennan's dissent in that case, he wrote: 
Our previous opinions have considered in dicta the motto and the Pledge, characterizing 
them as consistent with the proposition that govem.illent may not COllliTIUi'1icate an 
endorsement of religious belief. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 
716-717 (Brennan, J., dissenting). We need not return to the subject of 'ceremonial 
deism' [Justice Blackmun cites to his earlier ceremonial deism reference in County of 
Allegheny, supra note 12], because there is an obvious distinction between creche 
displays and references to God in the motto and the Pledge. However history may affect 
the constitutionality of nonsectarian references to religion by the government, history 
cannot legitimate practices that demonstrate the government's allegiance to a particular 
sect or creed. 21 
In her Allegheny concurrence, Justice O'Connor referred to legislative prayers and the 
court crier's "God save the United States and this honorable Court" as instances of ceremonial 
deism.22 Quoting her Lynch concurrence, she repeated that such official acts "serve the secular 
purposes of 'solemnizing public occasions' and 'expressing confidence in the future. "'23 She 
continued: "These examples of ceremonial deism do not survive Establishment Clause scrutiny 
simply by virtue of their historical longevity alone. Historical acceptance of a practice does not 
in itself validate that practice under the Establishment Clause if the practice violates the values 
In addition to these explicit references to ceremonial deism, the concept of ceremonial 
deism implicitly informs the majority opinion in Marsh v. Chambers, which upheld the Nebraska 
Legislature tradition of commencing its daily sessions with a chaplain-led prayer-the only 
20 !d. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. 668, 693) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
21 !d. at 603-604. 
22 !d. at 630. 
23 !d. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
24ld. 
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instance where such a prayer has withstood judicial scrutiny.25 Although the practice failed the 
Eighth Circuit's application of the Lemon test,26 the Supreme Court upheld the practice on 
account of its "unique history."27 Legislative prayer, according to the Court, ''is deeply 
embedded in the history and tradition of this country,"28 is ~·part of the fabric of our society."29 
In fact, the Framers' position on the practice's constitutionality is evident from their actions: 
"[T]hree days after Congress authorized the appointment of paid chaplains, final agreement was 
reached on the language of the Bill ofRights."3° From that moment till the present, "the practice 
of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious 
freedom. "31 ''To invoke Divine guidance on a public body ... is not, in these circumstances, an 
'establishment' of religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable 
acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."32 
B. Subsequent Use by the Lower Courts 
The term ceremonial deism was subsequently used by U.S. Courts of Appeals. In 
Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit Cotn1 upheld a school policy requiring daily Pledge recitations.33 Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, writing for the majority, based the cotn1's decision on the perception that "under 
God" amounted to a mere ceremonial reference, a phrase empty of its "original religious 
25 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
26 Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. Neb. 1982) (the practice failed the purpose and effect prongs 
because the chaplaincy promoted one religion, inasmuch as the Legislature had reappointed a Presbyterian 
minister to the chaplaincy for sixteen years running, and had published his prayers; and failed the 
entanglement prong because state money was used in order to pay for the chaplain and said prayers). 
27 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791. 
28 !d. at 787. 
29 !d. at 792. 
30 !d. at 788. 
31 Id. at 787. 
32 Id. at 792. 
33 Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F. 2d 437 (7th Cir. Ill. 1992). 
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significance."34 In doing so, the court favorably referenced Justice Brennan's dissent in Lynch-
namely, "the reference[] to God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can best be 
understood, in Dean Rostow' s apt phrase, as a form of 'ceremonial deism,' protected from 
Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any 
significant religious content."35 Further, the court quoted from Allegheny: 
Our previous opinions have considered in dicta the motto and the pledge, characterizing 
them as consistent with the proposition that the government may not communicate an 
endorsement of religious belief .... We need not return to the subject of 'ceremonial 
deism,' ... because there is an obvious distinction between creche displays and 
references to God in the motto and the pledge.36 
Directly following this quote, Justice Easterbrook noted, "Plaintiffs observe that the Court 
sometimes changes tune when it confronts a subject directly. True enough, but an inferior court 
had best respect what the majority says rather than read between the lines. If th.e Court proclaims 
that a practice is consistent with the Establishment Clause, we take its assurance seriously." 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Court used the term in Gaylor v. United 
States, where plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the national motto, ''In God We 
Trust."37 The motto, they argued, violated the Establishment Clause. The court, however, said 
the motto's "primary effect is not to advance religion; instead, it is a form of 'ceremonial deism' 
which through historical usage and ubiquity cannot be reasonably understood to convey 
government approval of religious belief. "38 The court supported this reference to ceremonial 
deism with citations to Justice O'Connor concurrences in Lynch and Allegheny, along with a 
citation to Justice Brennan's dissent in Lynch.39 
34 !d. at 447. 
35 !d. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
36 !d. at 447-448 (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602-603 (Blackmun, J., majority opinion)). 
37 Gaylorv. United States, 74 F.3d 214 (lOth Cir. Colo. 1996). 
38 /dat216. 
39 !d. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit used the term ceremonial deism in a majority 
opinion.40 The judge-petitioner in that case, North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal 
Foundation v. Constangy, argued that his habit of opening court with prayer was no more an 
official endorsement than the national motto or "God save the United State's and this Honorable 
Court."41 Citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Allegheny, the court countered: '~[T]hese 
brief references to God have been repeated so often that their religious meaning has diminished 
[sic] so that they are merely examples of 'ceremonial deism. "'42 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit used the term ceremonial deism in its majority 
opinion in A CL U v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd 43 Addressing a challenge to Ohio's 
state motto, "In God, all things are possible," the court maintained that the motto ''fits 
comfortably within this country's long and deeply entrenched tradition of civic piety, or 
~ceremonial deism,' as Yale Law School's Eugene Rostow called it."44 The court then quoted 
Marsh: "Like state-financed prayers by a legislative chaplain, 'it is simply a tolerable 
acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country. '"45 
As these examples demonstrate, lower courts have embraced the Supreme Court's use of 
the term ceremonial deism. Until2004, however, the Court had yielded no sustained analysis of 
the concept; accordingly, lower courts lacked conceptual boundaries. One danger, inherent in 
the Court's use of ceremonial deism, was that courts would perpetrate a secular gutting of 
religion, upholding official acknowledgements of religion by decreeing them serviceable but no 
longer spiritual. The harm was that some nonbelievers and religious adherents would yet feel the 
40 North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Foundation v. Constangy, 947 F. 2d 1145 (4th Cir. N.C. 
1991). 
411 d. at 1151. 
42 ld. (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
43 ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd, 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001). 
44 Id. at 300. 
45 ld. 
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sting of words hostile to their creed or guiding principles, while other religious adherents would 
learn, courtesy of magistrates, that they had been laboring under the misapprehension that choice 
religious words retained religious significance. In what follows, I examine whether Justice 
O'Connor put some or all of these concerns to rest in 2005. 
Ill. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S TEST FOR CEREMONIAL DEISM: CONTEXT AND BRIEF OVERVIEW 
In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, Justice O'Connor fashioned a test to 
identify constitutionally protected forms of ceremonial deism.46 At issue in the case was a 
California public school code that required teachers to open class with daily recitation of the 
Pledge of Allegiance. Respondent Michael Newdow, an atheist, argued that inclusion of the 
words "under God" violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. He brought suit 
on behalf of his daughter, a student in the school district, challenging the district's recitation 
policy and the Pledge itself. Newdow lost at District Court, but the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed, holding both the school policy and the Pledge unconstitutional.47 Subsequent 
to this holding, the child's biological mother, Sandra Banning, filed a motion for leave to 
intervene, arguing that she retained sole legal custody of their daughter, that neither she nor her 
uaughit:r shart:u 1~t:wuuw's av~;;;rsiou iu i.h~;;; s~.;huul puli~.;y, aml that Newduw's putsuit oftht: 
action would harm their daughter.48 The Ninth Circuit reconvened in order to address Newdow's 
standing in light of the altered custodial rights.49 The court denied Banning's motion and held 
that Newdow had standing, which he now exercised on behalf of his own interests and not on 
46 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 33 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
47 Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit later amended its 
decision, limiting the holding to the school district's policy (Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466 
(9th Cir. 2002)). 
48 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 9. The custody order was granted prior to Newdow's appeal before the Ninth 
Circuit (Newdow v. United States Cong., 313 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
49 Following the custody order, a superior court judge "entered an in personam order enjoining Newdow 
from pleading his daughter as an unnamed part or representing here as a 'next friend' in his lawsuit." Jd. at 
502. 
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behalf of his daughter's as well. 5° "Neither Ms. Banning's personal opinion regarding the 
Constitution nor her state court award of legal custody is determinative ofNewdow's legal rights 
h . . ,51 to protect lS own Interests. 
The Supreme Court heard Elk Grove Unified School District's appeal in 2004. A 
procedural matter, however, brought the issue to an anticlimactic end: a majority of the Court 
held that Newdow, a noncustodial parent, lacked standing. 52 Nonetheless, three justices-
Rehnquist,53 O'Connor, 54 and Thomas55-were prepared to go to the merits, and, further, to hold 
the Pledge constitutional. 
Justice O'Connor begins her concurrence by stating that the endorsement test should 
control in Establishment Clause cases. 56 Introduced by Justice O'Connor in Lynch, 57 the 
endorsement test stands for the proposition that government action "must not make a person's 
religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the political community by conveying a 
message 'that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred. "'58 Two principles 
inform application of the endorsement test. The first principle is that courts must examine 
official acknowledgments of religion from the viewpoint of a "reasonable observer."59 The 
second principle is that the "reasonable observer" must be "deemed aware of the history of the 
50 Owing to the superior court order (supra note 41 ), N ewdow no longer sought redress on behalf of the 
alleged injury to his daughter. See Newdow, 313 F.3d at 502. 
51 !d. at 505. 
52 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 18 (holding that "it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a 
plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when prosecution ofthe 
lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the source of the plaintiffs claimed standing"). 
53 ld at 18. 
54 ld at 33. 
55 ld at 45. 
56 ld at 34. 
57 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
58 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
59 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
11 
conduct in question, and must understand its place in our Nation's culturallandscape."60 
Justice 0' Connor explains her understanding of and rationale for ceremonial deism 
before supplementing the endorsement test with a new, four-factor analysis. "The constitutional 
value of ceremonial deism," she writes, "turns on a shared understanding of its legitimate 
nonreligious purposes."6 i Justice O'Connor submits two reasons why the Court should permit 
government "to refer to or commemorate religion in public life. "62 The first reason is that 
religious references can serve the secular purpose of commemorating national history. 63 The 
second reason is that religious references can uniquely serve the secular purpose of solemnizing 
public events.64 Justice O'Connor states that such references and acknowledgments are 
permissible in "a discrete category of cases"-a "category of 'ceremonial deism"' including the 
national motto, court invocations ("God save the United States and this Honorable Court"), and 
patriotic songs. 65 
Justice O'Connor next unveils a four-prong test to determine whether the Pledge offends 
the Establishment Clause or, rather, represents a permissible form of ceremonial deism.66 The 
test's first prong examines the "history and ubiquity" of a practice. The longer a practice has 
been observed throughout the Nation's history, the more deserving that practice is of 
constitutional protection. Similarly, the more a practice has circulated among citizens (i.e., the 
more ubiquitous it is), the more deserving that practice is of constitutional protection. 
The second prong is ~'absence of worship or prayer. "67 A practice forfeits constitutional 
protection to the extent that it seeks to place individuals in a "penitent state of mind, or ... create 
60 !d. at 35. 
61 !d. at 37. 
62 !d. at 35. 
63 !d. 
64 !d. at 36. 
65 !d. at 37. 
66 !d. 
67 !d. at 39. 
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a spiritual communion or invoke divine aid."68 "Only in the most extraordinary circumstances 
could actual worship and prayer be defended as ceremonial deism. "69 
The third prong is "absence of reference to particular religion."70 "[N]o religious 
acknowledgement could claim to be an instance of ceremonial deism if it explicitly favored one 
particular religious belief system over another."71 
The fourth prong is "minimal religious content"-i.e., requisite "brevity of a reference to 
religion or to God in a ceremonial exercise," relative to the balance of the speech content. 72 
IV. EXAMINING THE TEST FOR CEREMONIAL DEISM 
A. Assumptions Foundational to the Test 
Justice O'Connor predicates her test for ceremonial deism on three assumptions. These 
assumptions appear in her overview of ceremonial deism, which precedes her enunciation of the 
four-prong test. First, Justice O'Connor states that the endorsement test should govern analysis 
of the Pledge, and that this test relies on the "viewpoint of the reasonable observer."73 "Given 
the dizzying religious heterogeneity of our Nation," she writes, "adopting a subjective approach 
would reduce the test to an absurdity."74 On its face, however, the endorsement test exists to 
protect individuals at the margins of society: "Endorsement, I have explained, ~sends a message 
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community. "'75 The difficulty with this standard is that the reasonable observer, shorn of any 
dissident religious or counter-religious feelings, will find little to object to, and will therefore 
68 !d. at 40. 
69 !d. (citing lvfarsh, 463 U.S. 783). 
70 !d. at 42. 
71 !d. 
72/d. 
73 Id at 34. 
74 !d. at 34-35. 
75 !d. at 34. 
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leave some members of society without a voice in forums of justice. 
Second, Justice 0' Connor assumes that official references to religion attend to secular, 
not sacred, ends. "I believe that although these references speak in the language of religious 
belief, they are more properly understood as employing the idiom for essentially secular 
purposes."76 These secular purposes fall into two categories, one serving historical purposes, L~e 
other serving inspirational purposes. The former role of ceremonial deism allows government 
~~to commemorate the role of religion in our history." 77 On this assumption, government 
references to religion are merely "descriptive,"78 not normative or prescriptive. The inspirational 
role, meanwhile, assumes that official references to religion '"serve, in the only ways reasonably 
possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, 
expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of 
appreciation in society."'79 Ironically, the argument from historical use admits religion (we are 
permitted to reflect upon religion's role in shaping our land), but the argument from inspirational 
use excludes it (religious words are said to inspire predominantly secular emotions). Justice 
O'Connor does not account for this inconsistency. "Such references," she states, "can serve to 
solemnize an occasion instead of to invoke divine provenance."80 It is easy to understand the 
solemnizing effect-i.e., that religious words add moment to an event-but it is less easy to 
understand hovv these words effect a secular rather than religious air. If anything, their capacity 
to achieve the one result suggests a capacity to achieve the other-namely, for religious words to 
convey religious meaning. 
76 !d. at 35. 
77 !d. 
78 See id. at 40 ('~Even if taken literally, the phrase ['under God'] is merely descriptive; it purports only to 
identify the United States as a Nation subject to divine authority"). 
79 /d. at 36 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. 669, 692-693) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
80 !d. at 36. 
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Finally, Justice O'Connor draws upon her first and second assumptions to make a third 
assumption: "The reasonable observer discussed above, fully aware of our national history and 
the origins of such practices, would not perceive these acknowledgments as signifying a 
government endorsement of any specific religion, or even of religion over nonreligion."81 Thus 
derived, the third assumption rests upon these bases with something less than analytic firmness. 
The following critique of Justice O'Connor's will revisit these assumptions. It is important, 
though, to bear them in mind, in view of the fact that they are foundational to any apology for 
ceremonial deism. 
B. The Test's Four Prongs 
Justice O'Conner, having provided an overview of the endorsement test, along 
with the above assertions about ceremonial deism, observes: "This case requires us to 
determine whether the appearance of the phrase 'under God' in the Pledge of Allegiance 
constitutes an instance of such ceremonial deism. Although it is a close question, I 
conclude that it does, based on my evaluation of the following four factors. "82 I proceed 
now with an examination of these factors. 
1. ''History and Ubiquity" 
The first of the test's four prongs, "history and ubiquity," rests in part on the above 
assumption that religious words are capable of stimulating secular thoughts without serving 
religious purposes. "The constitutional value of ceremonial deism turns on a shared 
understanding of its legitimate nonreligious purposes," Justice O'Connor writes. "That sort of 
understanding can exist only when a given practice has been in place for a significant portion of 
the Nation's history, and when it is observed by enough persons that it can fairly be called 
81 !d. 
82 /d. at 37. 
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ubiquitous."83 To this is added the argument that "the history of a given practice is all the more 
relevant when the practice has been employed pervasively without engendering significant 
controversy. "84 In other words, we are asked to respect a practice on account of its endurance 
and familiarity, and on account of the tacit approval accorded that practice. These attributes, 
however, should not be permitted to immunize an official acknowledgement of religion. The 
same attributes, after all, attached to unconstitutional laws permitting slavery, segregation, anti-
miscegenation, and gender discrimination. Clearly, a legislative act can be flawed from its 
inception. As Justice Brennan observed: '"Legislators, influenced by the passions and exigencies 
of the moment, the pressure of constituents and colleagues, fuid the press of business, do not 
always pass sober constitutional judgment on every piece of legislation they enact, and this must 
be assumed to be as true of the Members of the First Congress as any other."85 
Underlying the ubiquity component of Justice O'Connor's first prong is the notion that 
religious language loses strength by dint of routine repetition. 86 "Any religious freight the words 
may have been meant to carry originally has long since been lost."87 We are asked to believe 
that broad, sustained practice enervates content. This view anchors not only the "history and 
ubiquity" factor but also the whole of Justice O'Connor's argument. Commentators, however, 
generally contest the idea.88 For one thing, the view does not explain how religious words lose 
strength as religious words, whereas secular words such as "liberty and justice" retain strength in 
their secular capacity. In addition, the view ''suggests that, when "initially used,' phrases like 'in 
83 !d. 
84 !d. at 38. 
85 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 814 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
86 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
87 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 41. See also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]hey 
[longstanding practices] serve a secular purpose rather than a sectarian one and have largely lost their 
religious significance over time"). 
88 B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and Change in Meaning Over 
Time, 59 Duke L.J. 705, 722 (2010). 
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God we trust' and 'under God' 'violated the Establishment Clause because they had not yet been 
rendered meaningless by repetitive use. "'89 Indeed, this critique can be extended to an 
individual's first encounters with official acknowledgements of religion-to, for instfu!Ce, a 
child's or adult immigrant's initial exposure to the Pledge. That is, the logic of Justice 
O'Connor's argument from longstanding national exposure is no less applicable to individual 
exposure: for every American, there is a period during which "under God" must necessarily 
retain its divine import, and during which the Establishment Clause is accordingly implicated. 
A court guided by the principle of ubiquity arrogates to itself an unpredictable power-
namely, the power to decide which words and therefore ideas retain vitality. Armed with this 
power, the Court can either uphold an official acknowledgment by declaring it dead, or forbid an 
acknowledgment by declaring it in the pink of health. In respect of the Pledge, the former 
approach-to say that "under God" lacks vigor qua religious language-discounts the effect that 
words register on believers and nonbelievers alike. On the one hand, Justice O'Connor 
overlooks the injury sustained by atheists such as Michael Newdow. On the other hand, Justice 
0' Connor overlooks the relevance of ''under God" to adherents of religion-as witnessed during 
the protests of citizens and politicians following the Ninth Circuit's ruling against California's 
Pledge statute.90 In Van Orden v. Perry, Justice Thomas decried the ubiquity argument for this 
very reason. "[RJepetition does not deprive religious words or symbols of their traditional 
meaning. Words like 'God' are not vulgarities for which the shock value diminishes with each 
successive utterance."91 Professor Douglas Laycock also dismissed the notion that these 
religious references are destitute of religious significance. In the amicus brief he prepared for 
89 Myers v. Loudoun County Pub Schs., 418 F. 3d 395,405 (4th Cir. Va. 2005) (quoting Sherman v. 
Community Consolidated Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F. 2d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 1992) (Manion J ., concurring)). 
90 Richard J. Ellis, To the Flag: The Unlikely History of the Pledge of Allegiance ix-x (2005). See also 
Trunk, supra note 25, at 572. 
91 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 696 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Newdovv on behalf of thirty-two Jewish and Christian clergy, Laycock offered this colorful 
disjunctive: "Either government is asking school children to make a sincere statement of belief 
in the one true God Whom the Nation is under, or it is asking children to take the name of the 
Lord in vain. Neither request is consistent with government's duty of neutrality toward and 
among religions."92 
Another concern attaches to the first of Justice O'Connor's four prongs. Assume, 
arguendo, that ubiquity does numb individuals to religious connotation. The detachment that 
settles over individuals on account of routine will just as effortlessly disperse upon moments of 
national crisis. At such times-in the wake of 9/11 hostilities, for instance-official references 
to God and religion may lose their rumored weakness. The "reasonable observer," on hand 
during a national crisis, would doubtless perceive a great deal of religious freight in stout 
utterances of "under God" and other sacred phrasings; the reasonable observer would fmd it 
difficult to believe that the government had not conveyed a message "that religion or religious 
belief is favored or preferred."93 At best, then, the words are dormant offenses to the 
Establishment Clause, susceptible to reawakening upon, for instance, a religiously motivated 
attack on our soil. This phenomenon raises a valid challenge to the ~~ubiquity" prong, and it does 
so using elements central to Justice O'Connor's support of that factor. Duration and diffusion, 
according to Justice O'Connor, govern the meaning of words. If, however, time and place 
exhaust a word's religious meaning, it should not be wondered that time and place can revivify 
that meaning. 
The "history and ubiquity" prong hinges on the untenable claim that a reasonable 
92 Brief for Rev. Dr. Betty Jane Bailey et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 
(2004) (No. 1624). 
93 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
18 
observer, fully aware of the Pledge's history and origins, would not regard "under God" as a 
government endorsement.94 To the contrary, the legislative history of the 1954 amendment to 
the Pledge95 reveals that "the sole purpose was to advance religion .... "96 Sen. Homer Ferguson, 
sponsor of the 1954 measure to add the words "under God," said, "'I have felt that the Pledge ... 
should recognize the Creator who we really believe is in control of the destinies of this great 
Republic."97 Both Sen. Ferguson and Rep. Louis Rabaut, sponsor of the measure in the House, 
regarded the addition of "under God" as a means of differentiating Americans from our Cold 
War enemy, the "atheistic" Communists.98 A statement by Rep. Rabaut, adopted by the House 
Report, explained that the amended Pledge would alert Americans "to the true meaning of our 
country and its form of government."99 "More importantly," he continued, "the children of our 
land, in the daily recitation of the Pledge in school, will be daily impressed with a true 
understanding of our way of life and its origins." 100 The congressman was not merely speaking 
of "under God" in terms of the historical appreciation it would arouse; rather, he was talking 
about the present ("our way of life"). Justice O'Connor has embraced the former application of 
the words-namely, "to commemorate the role of religion in our history"101 ; the latter 
application, however, invokes an improper governmental use of religious words. The newly 
94 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 37 and 43 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
95 See Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249 (1954) (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. 4 
(2000 & Supp. III 2003)) (the language of the Pledge, as provided by the Act, reads: "I pledge allegiance to 
the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, 
indivisible, with liberty and justice for a all"). 
96 Newdow, 292 F.3d at 610. 
97 Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 440, n. 5 (1962) (quoting 100 Cong. Rec. 6348). 
98 Ellis, supra note 52 at 131-133. 
99 Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist, 597 F.3d 1007, 1032 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010) (quoting H.R. Rep. 
No. 83-1693, 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N 2339,2347 (May 28, 1954)). The House Report also noted: ~~At this 
moment of our history the principles underlying our American Government and the American way of life 
are under attack by a system whose philosophy is at direct odds with our own. [O]ur American 
Government is founded on the concept of the individuality and the dignity of the human being. Underlying 
this concept is the belief that the human person is important because he was created by God and endowed 
by Him with certain inalienable rights which no civil authority may usurp." I d. at 2340. 
100 Newdow, 597 F.3d at 1032. 
101 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 35 (O'Connor, J. concurring). 
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minted Pledge, according to the congressman, not only says that we are a religious people, but is 
intended to impress this upon children. l\!Iore tellingly yet, Rep. Rabaut declared that the 
~~unbridgeable gap between America and Communist Russia is a belief in Almighty God .... 
[U]nless we are willing to affirm our belief in the existence of God ... we ... open the floodgates 
to tyranny and oppression."102 Clearly, the addition of"under God" represented religious intent 
on the part of legislators. "The claim that the addition of 'under God' conveys only a trivial 
religious meaning ignores the multiple specific, extensive, and quite pointedly religious 
arguments of every government official who spoke on the matter and was directly responsible for 
making the change." 103 Under McGowan v. Maryland, this shift in legislative intent is not only 
relevant but controlling. McGowan, which stressed the importance of legislative intent, upheld 
Sunday closing laws on grounds that language in the most current statutes reflected an "air of ... 
relaxation rather than one ofreligion."104 McGowan, in other words, held that whereas Sunday 
closings originated out of nakedly religious purposes-purposes no longer deemed constitutional 
under Establishment Clause jurisprudence-laws supporting the closings had been updated to 
reflect secular rather than sacred purposes. Thus updated, the Sunday closing laws overcame 
challenge under the Establishment Clause. McGowan, therefore, prompts scrutiny of evolving 
legislative intent. Applied to the Pledge, the principle of McGowan reveals an unacceptable 
reversal: legislative backing for the 1954 Act substituted religious intent for secular intent. This 
conclusion is hardly shocking, given the legislative sweat and histrionics exerted on behalf of 
102 See Ellis, supra note 70, at 134. 
103 Steven. G. Gey, "Under God," The Pledge of Allegiance, And Other Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C.L. 
Rev. 1865, 1877 (2003) (arguing that "at every point in its analysis, the House Report [on the addition of 
"under God" to the Pledge] subordinates the nation's political structure to the majority's religious ideal"; 
that ''all the other evidence relating to the passage of the 1954 statute ... confirms the Report's single-
mindedly religious approach"; and that the Senate Report is "no less explicitly religious in its stated 
o bj ecti ve"). 
104 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,448 (1961). 
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two words: "under God."105 The shift, though, reveals the unconstitutionality of the Pledge. If 
McGowan upheld Sunday closing laws on account of a religious-to-secular shift in legislative 
intent, the 1954 Act must be rejected on account of its secular-to-religious shift, whereby a 
secular oath became religious. 
Justice O'Connor's reliance on the "reasonable observer" creates another problem. On 
its face, the Endorsement Test exists to protect "outsiders."106 Assuming, arguendo, that the 
Pledge was amended for wholly secular reasons, the proper focus should nonetheless fall upon 
school children-that is, the reasonable school child and not a reasonable observer of ripe age. It 
is children, after all, who are made to recite or, minimally, listen to the Pledge; who, on account 
of their age and mandatory confmement, are uniquely impressionable, uniquely vulnerable. 
Moreover, the Lemon test and endorsement test look to the effect of a government action, not 
merely its purpose; it is necessary to determine, here, whether the effect of Pledge recitation is to 
communicate to children a message that government endorses religion. Unfortunately, Justice 
O'Connor's ceremonial deism test restricts analysis to the viewpoint of an adult (the "reasonable 
observer"), preventing accurate assessment of injury. 
2. ''Absence of Worship or Prayer" 
The "absence of worship or prayer" factor omits significant questions and analyses. 
First, Justice O'Connor provides an insufficient definition of prayer and worship. ''Any 
statement that has as its purpose placing the speaker or listener in a penitent state of mind, or that 
is intended to create a spiritual communion or invoke divine aid, strays from the legitimate 
105 During a thirteen-month period, congressmen submitted eighteen joint resolutions calling for the 
addition of"under God" to the Pledge. See Ellis, supra note 70, at 133. 
106 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Endorsement, I have explained, 'sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community"'). 
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secular purposes of solemnizing an event and recognizing a shared religious history."107 No 
mention is made of praise, notwithstanding the universally acknowledged role of praise in the 
context ofprayer. 108 Arguably, though, the Pledge more than gestures toward praise, in 
consequence of which it may be correct to think of the Pledge in terms of prayer. Second, 
Justice O'Connor focuses on intent alone, rather than on intent and effect ("any statement that 
has as its purpose placing the speaker or listener in a penitent state of mind .... " 109). But the 
endorsement test concerns itself with whether a reasonable observer would perceive a 
government endorsement of religion, irrespective of government's purpose. 110 Third, the 
"'absence of worship or prayer" factor does not allow for psychological equivalencies between 
prayer and oaths. Justice O'Connor appears to forestall this criticism. "Of course, any statement 
can be imbued by a speaker or listener with the qualities of prayer. But ... [a reasonable] 
observer could not conclude that reciting the Pledge, including the phrase 'under God,' 
constitutes an instance of worship." 111 Again, though, the proper viewpoint for this analysis 
should be that of a reasonable school child, not that of an adult. 112 It may remain an open 
question whether adults regard the Pledge as touching on prayer. Children, on the other hand, 
are more likely to construe the oath as a spiritual petition. Research, in fact, points to this very 
phenomenon. "Social science research has ... found that insofar as young schoolchildren ascribe 
107 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 40 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
108 Prayer is "the relating of the self or soul to God in trust, penitence, praise, petition, and purpose, either 
individually or corporately." John Bowker ed., The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions 762 (1997). 
109 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 40 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
110 !d. at 36; see also James M. Lewis and Michael L. Vild, Note, A Controversial Twist of Lemon: The 
Endorsement Test as the New Establishment Clause Standard, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 671, 689 (1990) 
("This is the rationale for having an effects prong in addition to a purpose prong: actions done with 
permissible intent may still have impermissible effects upon those unaware of the intent"). 
111 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 40. 
112 Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 
1545 (20 1 0). Although she does not focus on children, Corbin argues that "the supposedly objective 
reasonable person too often equates to a reasonable Christian. Corbin draws on a feminist critique of the 
"reasonable person" standard in sexual discrimination cases, arguing that the reasonable person is often a 
male who cannot begin to appreciate the unique vulnerability of a female victim of sexual discrimination, 
and who therefore reinforces the inequalities fundamental to the problem of sexual discrimination. 
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any meaning to the Pledge, they perceive 'under God' as expressing religious belief: 'The 
questionnaire responses showed that a number of second-grade children believed the Pledge of 
Allegiance was a prayer to God. "'113 
If it can be shown that elements of prayer are absent from the Pledge, comparable 
attributes may offset such absence. For instance, the Ten Commandments do not necessitate 
prayer, but the Stone Court held against state-mandated postings of the Commandments on 
classroom walls. 114 "If the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, 
it will be to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the 
Commandments. l-Iowever desirable this might be as a matter of private devotion, it is not a 
permissible state objective under the Establishment Clause."115 Applied to the Pledge, Stone 
raises valid questions about the effect of"under God," not least because the Pledge involves 
recitation by children. The risk inherent in the act-of intoning "under God" in ritualistic 
fashion-is arguably greater than that implicated by posting the Decalogue. The "absence of 
worship or prayer" prong, therefore, is too narrow. 
Justice O'Connor unnecessarily downplays the religious import of"under God." "Even 
if taken literally," she writes, "the phrase is merely descriptive; it purports only to identify the 
United States as a Nation subject to divine authority."116 Having thus designated the phrase, she 
is able to conclude that the reasonable observer would not detect an element of worship in the 
Pledge. However, in order to reach this conclusion, she omits to grapple with the logical relation 
and meaning of words within the text. It must first be observed that "allegiance" is a potent 
113 Brief for Americans United for Separation of Church and State, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Affirmance, Elk Grove, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (quoting Robert D. Hess & Judith V. Torney, The Development 
of Political Attitudes in Children 105 (1967)). 
114 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1981). 
115 !d. at 42. 
116 !d. at 40. 
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word. "Allegiance" is defined as '~the fidelity owed by a subject or citizen to a sovereign or 
govemment."117 Additionally, "'allegiance" is defined as "devotion or loyalty to a person, group, 
or cause.~' 118 "Allegiance" in the Pledge is sworn to the "republic," which is "'under God"; 
definitions of"under" include "subject to the authority, control, guidance, or instruction of."119 
If, then, "allegiance" is being sworn to the ''republic," which is "under God," it follows that 
"allegiance" (devotion or loyalty) is being surrendered onto God (to whose authority and control 
the republic is subject). The hierarchical development of this claim follows cleanly in the text, 
its logic and momentum established by the relation of "republic" to ''flag": "I pledge allegiance 
to the flag of the United States of America, and to the republic for which it stands .... " This 
interrelation of words suggests a not insignificant religious dimension, the effect of which is to 
greatly surpass "merely descriptive" phrasing. Even prior to the addition of "under God," the 
Court in Barnette observed: ''[T]he ... pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of 
mind."120 The addition of"under God," therefore, raises valid questions about the prayer or 
worship aspects of the Pledge, particularly owing to the performance aspects of this national 
institution. 121 At the very least, "under God" cannot be deemed ''merely descriptive." ''To 
recite that the nation is 'under God,' writes Douglas Laycock, "is inherently a religious 
affirmation." 122 ''When we pledge allegiance to One nation under God, our citizens participate in 
an important American tradition of humbly seeking the wisdom and blessing of Divine 
117 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, lOth ed. 
118 !d. 
119 !d. 
120 W.Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,633 (1943) (holding against compulsory flag salute 
and compulsory recitation of Pledge). 
121 The performance aspect of the Pledge raises additional questions. Pledge recitals require an effort of 
mind and body-a combined attentiveness somewhat unique to our age. The effect of this-of reciting 
words and placing a hand on one's heart-bears examination. Possibly the act places individuals in an 
attitude of prayer. 
122 Douglas Laycock, Theological Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding 
the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 188 Harv. L. Rev. 155, 224 (2004). 
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Providence."123 
3. "Absence of Reference to Particular Religion" 
The "absence of reference to particular religion" prong ignores the plain language of the 
Pledge. The plain language evokes a particular understanding of deity and therefore favors one 
form of religion over other forms of religion. First, "under God" invokes the deity of 
monotheistic religion. Hindus, Buddhists, Wiccans, Native Americans, even Secular 
Humanists 124 are effectively marginalized by the religious component of the Pledge-either 
because they believe in multiple gods or in no god at all. Second, ~'under God" implies an 
interventionist deity with interest in and jurisdiction over the United States. Among those 
alienated, in this instance, are none other than deists. 125 
To date, the Court's ceremonial deism analysis has been highly colored by the Judeo-
Christian beliefs of the majority of American society .... Specifically, the selective 
application of ceremonial deism only to those religious symbols consistent with the 
Judeo-Christian tradition ... serves both to overlook and exclude nonadherents from the 
definition of what it means to be an "American." This in turn threatens to rend the 
·~fabric of society" because it reiterates the force of religion in maintaining standing in the 
political community. 126 
The theological connotations of "under God," therefore, confer a benefit upon adherents 
to monotheistic religions. The majority in McCreary County stressed that the Establishment 
123 !d. at 225. 
124 The Court has deemed secular humanists to be religious adherents, notwithstanding their absence of 
belief in deity. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,495 n. 11 (1961). 
125 It is no small irony that the doctrine of ceremonial deism risks alienating deists themselves. Deists have 
greatly multiplied in recent years, according to the American Religious Identification Survey. 
Commissioned by the Program on Public Values, Trinity College, the 2008 survey coined the word 
"Nones" to identify individuals who claim "no religion." The survey estimates that 34 million adults 
comprise the None demographic, and "most Nones [59%] are neither atheists nor theists but rather 
agnostics and deists ... " Dr. Barry A. Kosmin, et al., American Nones: The Profile of the No Religion 
Population (A Report Based on the American Religious Identification Survey of2008), 
http://www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org. 
126 Charles Gregory Warren, Comment, No Need to Stand on Ceremony: The Corruptive Jrifluence of 
Ceremonial Deism and the Needfor a Separationist Reconfiguration ofthe Supreme Court's Establishment 
Clause Jurisprudence, 54 Mercer L. Rev. 1669, 1703-1704 (2003). 
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Clause requires government to observe neutrality in respect of religion. The majority countered 
the dissent's claim that "the deity the Framers had in mind was the God of monotheism, with the 
consequence that government may espouse a tenet of traditional monotheism."127 On the 
contrary, argued the majority, the Framers operated within a much more religiously 
circumscribed mentality; their pressing concern involved contests among Christian bodies, not 
other religious bodies-not even other monotheistic religions.128 "Justice Story probably 
reflected the thinking of the framing generation when he wrote in his Commentaries that the 
purpose of the [Establishment] Clause was 'not to countenance, much less to advance, 
Ma.~ometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry 
among Christian sects."'129 From this, the Court noted, it is evident that interpretation of the 
Constitution will necessarily result in ''applications unanticipated by the Framers,"130 and that the 
spirit of the Framers must be honored in such a way as to strive for neutrality in matters of 
religion pertinent to our time. 131 
By definition, the "absence of reference to particular religion" factor does not address 
whether an official act amounts to an unconstitutional preference in favor of religion over 
nonreligion. Neither does Justice O'Connor's application of her test demonstrate any sympathy 
for this issue. 132 Under the Establishment Clause, however, "the touchstone for our analysis is 
127 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 879 (2005). 
128 Jd. 
129 !d. (quoting R. Cord, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction 13 (1988) 
(emphasis deleted by the Court)). 
130 !d. at 881. 
131 The Court addressed the relevance of the Framers' own actions in respect of official acknowledgments 
of religion: ~'The dissent cites material suggesting that separationists like Jefferson and Madison were not 
absolutely consistent in abstaining from official religious acknowledgment. But, a record of inconsistent 
historical practice is too weak a lever to upset decades of precedent adhering to the neutrality principle. 
And it is worth noting that Jefferson thought his actions were consistent with nonendorsement of religion 
and Madison regretted any backsliding he may have done." !d. at 879, n. 25. 
132 Justice O'Connor does not wrestle with this question; rather, she handles it in conclusory fashion-
"genera] acknowledgments of religion need not be viewed by reasonable observers as denigrating the 
nonreligious"-before turning to questions of sectarian endorsement (Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 42 
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the principle that the 'First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and 
religion, and between religion and nonreligion. "'133 "The First Amendment leaves the 
Government in a position not of hostility to religion but of neutrality. The philosophy is that the 
atheist or agnostic-the nonbeliever-is entitled to go his own way." 134 In 2008, more than 1.6 
million adults identified themselves as atheists-almost double the amount in 2001.135 The 
Pledge imposes special difficulties on atheists, not least the suggestion that belief in and 
submission to God is a mark of good citizenship. Michael Newdow shared his own burden 
during oral argument before the Court: "I am an atheist. I don't believe in God. And every 
school morning my child is asked to stand up, face that flag, put her hand over her heart, and say 
that her father is wrong." 136 Hence, this prong of the ceremonial deism test offers unclear 
guidance, to the extent that it does not wrestle with a broader standard of protection available 
under the Establishment Clause. 
4. ''Minimal Religious Content" 
The "minimal religious content" factor underestimates the potency of religious language, 
particularly of references to the divine. Justice 0' Connor dismisses the effect of ""under God" in 
the Pledge by means of a questionably relevant contrast: two words in the context of a thirty-one-
word recitation. 137 References to God, however, bear great conceptual weight. 138 In the Pledge 
itself, ''under God" encompasses ''flag," "'republic," "nation"-the whole secular reality. 139 In 
addition, the unequal balance between secular and sacred language in a text may be offset by 
(O'Connor, J. concurring)). 
133 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). 
134 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
135 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, supra note 78. The Department's Statistical Abstract put the number of 
agnostics at 1,985,000, a.'ld those claiming "no religion" at 30,427,000. 
136 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. 1, respondent's oral argument, 2004 U.S. Trans. Lexis 27 (U.S. Trans. 2004). 
137 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 43 (O'Connor, J. concurring). 
138 Certainly this appears true of children, as evidenced by the above-mentioned study (supra note 63). 
139 See my earlier analysis, where I discuss the "logical relation and meaning of words within the text." 
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other factors. Here, where legislators added "under God" to a popular, secular text, and did so to 
great fanfare, those added words assumed a heft unrecognized by Justice O'Connor's simple 
arithmetic. What is important is not the quantitative relation between the sacred and secular 
words but rather their qualitative relation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Justice O'Connor's attempt to systematize analysis of ceremonial deism, while 
commendable, fails to legitimate this legal concept. Her method trades on assumptions 
that her four prongs not only fail to offset, but ultimately rely upon. Central to her test is 
the notion that official references to God no longer haul "religious freight." 140 This, 
however, is an assumption whose inherent troubles Justice O'Connor never dispels. The 
assumption assigns arbitrary power to judges, who are not equipped to dabble in the field 
of"semantic shift." Also key to Justice O'Connor's test is her reliance upon the 
"reasonable observer," a fictive adult with what appears to be an unflappable religious 
sensibility. As I have shown, however, this standard deserts members of society whom 
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test purports to champion: "nonadherents" and 
"outsiders."141 In the context of ceremonial deism, the reasonable observer standard 
offers inadequate protection to dissidents and children. This is especially troubling in 
respect of the latter class of individuals, whom the Court has otherwise shielded from 
creeping indoctrination and coercion. In Lee v. Weisman, the Court observed: "[T]here 
are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive 
pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools .... Our decisions in Engel v. 
Vitale and School Dist. of Abington recognize, among other things, that prayer exercises 
140 Elk Grove, 542 at 41. 
141 !d. at 34. 
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in public schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion."142 In view of this concern, 
the Lee Court held against graduations prayers led by a member of clergy, "under 
circumstances where ... young graduates who object are induced to conform."143 
Applied to the Pledge, it is doubly likely that school children will face coercive pressure, 
not least because of policies requiring daily recitation of the oath. Under Lee, it should 
not matter that students are permitted to opt out of the Pledge: their tender age, coupled 
with the unique environment, can induce conformity. But Justice O'Connor's reasonable 
observer standard ignores the child's perception. So, too, does her test ignore the 
question of physical context (e.g., a classroom environment). An additional prong would 
correct this oversight, provided the reasonable observer standard were concomitantly 
enlarged. In addition to a context prong, and in view of Lee, the test would also benefit 
from a coercion prong. 
142 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,593 (1992) (citations omitted). 
143 /d. at 599. 
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